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ABSTRACT 
A congested strait providing entry to a port contains 
many benign non-hostile vessels. Some of the vessels are 
large ships (:Ss) carrying dangerous cargo. Others are 
small boats (SBs), undistinguished in type, but not 
behavior. Two maritime security threats (Reds) are a 
hijacked :S carrying dangerous cargo, andEor a SB manned by 
terrorists attempting to cause damage to other vessels or 
to the port. The Red SB can either conduct a direct attack 
upon entering the strait, or a sneak attack by hiding among 
other neutral SBs. The defense force consists of shore-
based sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned 
surface vehicles (USVs), and patrol craft (PC). The shore-
based radar and the UAVs initially classify unidentified 
vessels as suspicious or not suspicious. Vessels classified 
as suspicious must be inspected intensively by a USV or PCJ 
PC inspection often requires boarding, a time consuming 
process that may frequently result in no incriminating 
findings.  
Analytical models are introduced to analyze 
requirements for numbers and capabilities of surveillance 
assets and to assess the effectiveness of concepts of 
operations (CONOPS) for defense forces to achieve a desired 
probability of detecting and intercepting the threat. The 
models incorporate both differential equations and 
probabilistic arguments. The model results indicate that if 
the UAVs generate many false positives then the USVs and 
PCs have a high (and often futile) workload, which 
decreases the probability of detecting a threat. Further, 
USVs and PCs should give a high priority to inspecting 
 vi
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$ed boat from among other suspicious SBs. 8n scenario B, a 
$ed boat can either be detected while it is hiding among 
other SBs, or when it commences attac<. =nce the $ed boat 
commences attac< in scenario B, the situation is modeled as 
scenario A with a shorter reaction time for the USV (or 
PC). The results are based on an arrival rate of 1H SBs per 
hour and an average of IJ unidentified SBs in the strait at 
any time. To achieve a probability of detection of the $ed 
boat of at least L.M in good visibility conditions, the 
recommended =$BAT mix of six USVs and three PCs without any 
UAV is recommended, at an estimated cost of USNO.P million 
per year for a period of 1L years. A mixed USV and PC =$BAT 
is recommended for a more robust surveillance force in 
terms of deterrence and exercising ground judgment. USVs 
are useful in situations when it is not necessary to ris< 
human lives. 8f a UAV is included, the recommended mix is 
one UAV, two PCs and six USVs, at an estimated cost of 
USNR.P million per year for a period of 1L years. 8n poor 
visibility conditions, the probability of detection drops 
by about SLT. 
The analysis of the SB model results also provides 
insight into the effectiveness of possible !"#$% "'()*+#, 
for the surveillance platforms. The UAV contribution is 
only positive when it highly accurately in classifies 
neutral (Uhite) SBs. Uhen the UAV mista<enly classifies a 
nonVsuspicious SB as suspicious, a USV or PC must do 
further inspections on the SB. Thus, UAVs can undesirably 
increase the wor<load for the USVs and PCs, and result in 
small improvements in the probability of detection in SB 
threat scenario A. The UAV ability to Wuic<ly identify SBs 
is more useful in SB threat scenario B as the $ed boat is 
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hidin' amon' other ./s1 2n this model there is no advanta'e 
to havin' the 567 follo9 suspicious ./s= especiall> if the 
perceived threat is ./ threat scenario 61 ?onversel>= the 
5.7 should 'ive hi'hest priorit> to inspectin' suspicious 
./s rather than identif>in' unsuspicious ./s in order to 




I. I$T&O()CTIO$  
+. B+C-.&O)$( 
A littoral state (also referred as Blue state) is 
concerned about the maritime security of the main strait 
that its ports, and economy, depend on. This strait is also 
an international strait as it is an essential connection 
between two major international shipping lanes. Therefore, 
the shipping traffic in the strait consists of ships that 
are calling at the littoral state?s ports and ships that 
are transiting through it to get from one major shipping 
lane to the other. As a high volume of shipping traffic 
uses the strait daily, the littoral state is concerned that 
the strait is vulnerable to the threat of maritime 
terrorism, and aims to enhance maritime security in its 
strait. As part of the littoral state?s strategy to enhance 
maritime security, it has decided to improve its 
surveillance coverage. Anhancements in surveillance of the 
strait are efforts to increase the probability of detection 
of any potential threats to security, and serve as a 
deterrent.  
The homeland security department (HSD) of the littoral 
state has decided that it needs a suite of different sensor 
platforms to supplement its existing system of coastal 
surveillance radars. The suite of sensor platforms will 
consist of manned surface vessels or patrol craft (PC), 
unmanned surface vessels (USV), and unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV). The homeland security department wants to 
! "
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Characteristics of Operational Environment 
An abstract geographical area is the setting for this 
analysis. The strait is bounded on two sides by landmasses 
belonging to the littoral states. The main sea routes in 
the strait are defined by a traffic separation scheme 
(TSS), which is a two-lane traffic way running east-west. 
The main points of entry and exit are at the terminals of 
the TSS and along the strait leading to the ports of the 
littoral state. Cross-strait traffic exists along several 










Figure 1. Pictorial representation of the abstract strait 






The notional strait has a set of key characteristics 
that pose challenges to surveillance. 
Geographical 8hallenges: 
!! There are many small islands scattered along the 
coast, which may cause blind spots and clutter to 
radar and visual surveillance. 
!! There are multiple crossing points throughout the 
length of the strait that are used mainly by 
local traffic, such as pleasure and fishing 
crafts and ferries. These also add clutter and 
distraction to radar and visual surveillance. 
Environmental 8hallenges: 
!! The high traffic density in the strait poses a 
high demand on the resources required for 
surveillance. The typical traffic density for a 
major international shipping strait is about 500 
ships transiting per day for vessels above D5 
gross ton. 
!! The presence of numerous small vessels and boats 
present possible concealment for illicit 
activities. The density can be about 100 small 
vessels in the strait continuously. 
!! There are many unaccounted vessels in the strait. 
These are the vessels that are not equipped with 
automatic identification systems (AIS) and are 
not required to report their movements. Most of 
these vessels are SBs involved in private leisure 
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activities or fishing. However, some can be 
involved in illicit activities that Blue (B) 
wishes to prevent. 
 
!. $%reats +, -ariti/e $err+ris/  
After the >/@@ terrorist attacks in the B.S., there 
has been, and continues to be, a heightened international 
awareness of the threat of terrorism in transportation, 
including that in the maritime domain. Maritime terrorism 
threats generally fall into two categoriesF those carried 
out by small boats (SBs) and those carried out with larger 
ships. The use of SBs in guerilla-style attacks and suicide 
attacks targeted at vessels in transit, at pier-side or 
anchorage, belongs to the first category. Examples of such 
attacks in recent years are the attacks on the BSS Cole in 
Aden (2000) and on the Mrench tanker MV %imburg off the 
coast of Oemen (200P). In these attacks the terrorists used 
SBs laden with explosives as their mode of delivery.  
The second category concerns the use of RSs, 
particularly those carrying highly dangerous cargoes, to 
inflict extensive damage. Terrorists can hiSack a ship 
carrying dangerous cargoes such as liquefied natural gas 
(RNV) and/or hazardous chemicals and use it as a floating 
bomb to blow up in the port. The hiSacked ship can also be 
used to import weapons of mass destruction (XMY). Although 
there is a low probability of such a scenario, the possible 
fallout and other consequences from even one such 
occurrence is enough reason for states with high dependency 
on maritime trades to act in a precautionary manner. 
 "
The littoral (Blue) state is concerned with these two 
categories of threats. They will be modeled and analyze in 
this study. 
 
3. Surveillance Capabilities 
The underlying problem faced by the littoral state in 
the surveillance of its operational environment is that 
each of the appro>imately ?@@ to "@@ vessels plying the 
strait everyday could potentially be a threat. Aence, a 
comprehensive surveillance system is necessary to provide 
the required level of situational awareness to pick out the 
threat amongst the legitimate traffic.   
The littoral state has an e>isting system of coastal 
surveillance radars (CSRs) and electro-optic/infrared 
(EO/IR) systems positioned along the coastline. These 
systems, together with Vessel Traffic Nanagement 
Information System (VTNIS) and the Automatic Identification 
System (AIS)
2
, enables the littoral stateQs maritime 
authority to know the location and identification
R
 of most 
of the vessels in the strait. The effectiveness of the 
current suite of radars and modes of detection are limited 
in the straitQs highly cluttered and congested environment. 
                     
2 International Naritime Organization (INO) (2@@S) regulations 
require ships of certain tonnage and class to be fitted with the AIS.  
The AIS is capable of providing information about the ship to other 
ships and to coastal authorities automatically.  It provides 
information - including the shipTs identity, type, position, course, 
speed, navigational status, destination and other safety-related 
information. 
R Uame, registration, country of origin, owners, general physical 
description, etc. 
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First, the +SRs are generally used for long-range, 
wide-area detection and tracking of large vessels. In the 
highly cluttered environment of a congested strait, the 
+SRs can be overloaded and sometimes give false echoes. The 
radar clutter and shadows can mask legitimate targets. 
Second, the +SRs’ detection range of small vessels, such as 
a speedboat, is typically very short. Coreover, the +SRs 
are positioned on only one side of the strait, so that the 
detection of small vessels at the far side of the strait is 
degraded, a situation that may be known and exploited by 
opponents. The land-based EO/IR systems also have a shallow 
angle of view when looking at vessels far away, which means 
that these systems cannot see behind large obHects such as 
LSs and islands.  
In addition to the surveillance sensors, the maritime 
authority also uses the AIS to automatically detect vessels 
fitted with the AIS. The AIS automatically identifies and 
provides authorities with information on the positions of 
the vessels in the strait. This allows the maritime 
authority to have an improved situational picture of the 
strait. Also, by cross-referencing the vessels’ identities 
against its database, the Blue’s maritime authority can get 
more information, such as whether the vessel is scheduled 
to call in to its port. However, there are still many 
vessels that do not have AIS, such as non-compliant vessels 
and smaller vessels that do not come under ICO regulations 
due to their small gross tonnage. It is possible for the 
local maritime authority to enforce AIS for smaller vessels 
(not required under ICO regulations), but such a measure is 
limited to vessels registered in that state. Furthermore, 
even if a vessel’s identification is known, it is possible 
 "
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clutter environment where short1range radar generally has 
better resolution. Through the use of high1resolution EO/IR 
systems on the surveillance platforms, the C2 center can 
conduct detailed and close1up visual inspections on 
vessels. Under reduced visibility conditions, the mobile 
sensors can move closer to the targets, something land1
based systems cannot do. Finally, in order to generate a 
coherent situational picture, fusion of all information 
collected by both land1based and mobile sensors will be 
necessary. Eata fusion of a surveillance system with 
multiple sensors is complex and is subjected to error and 
delay, but there are also proposed solutions to address 
them (Efe, Iilmaz, K Eura Eonmez, 2LLM). 
In terms of speed and maneuverability, the UAV is 
typically three to four times faster than the USV or PC 
(about 1LL112Lkts compared with UL1VLkts). Waving greater 
speed, the UAV will spend less time transiting from one 
target to another. As an airborne platform, it can quickly 
conduct an all1around inspection of its target and allow 
the C2 center to see behind large obstacles that may 
conceal SB threats. Eownward1looking air1borne sensors also 
have fewer blind zones. As a result, the UAV can 
expeditiously survey a large area and reduce the risk of 
overlooking small targets. The EO/IR sensors on the UAV 
give a plain view of the exposed decks of a vessel that may 
not be possible for upward1 or level1looking sensors on a 
surface platform. This non1invasive inspection capability, 
to some extent, allows authorities to ascertain normality 
of the onboard activities of the vessel.  This type of 
information is useful in assessing the classification of 
targets. VTOZ UAVs, such as the [orthrop1\rumman’s 
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II. $ESCRIPTION OF MO$ELS 
A simple CONOPS for two types of maritime terrorism 
(8ed) threats will be addressed and developed in this 
chapter. The threats can be classified as large-siDed 
shipping threats, and small boat (SF) threatsG of course 
not all large or small vessels are threats, but many 
searches by Flues (Fs) are distracted by benign traffic. 
Speedy and accurate identification by F is a valuable 
asset. For the purpose of this thesis, a large ship (JS) is 
defined as a vessel above K00 gross tons (GT) that carries 
the IOO-mandated AIS. A SF is defined as a vessel that is 
below K00 GT and hence does not come under IOO regulations 
to carry AIS.   
The concern in large-siDed shipping threats is that a 
JS that carries haDardous cargo could be hiPacked by, or 
fall under the control of terrorists and used as a floating 
bomb. Rangerous cargo refers to inflammable and explosive 
cargo that could be used as fuel for a bomb. The obPective 
of the JS threat would be to ignite the explosive cargo in 
port or at the dangerous cargo terminals (Fateman 200U). 
The concern in the SFs threat is the use of SFs in 
guerilla-style or suicide attacks. These SFs could attempt 
to disguise themselves to blend into the local small vessel 
traffic, for example pretending to be local fishing boats. 
The obPective of the SF threat is to deliver and detonate 
an explosive payload to a high-value target berthed in the 
harbor or transiting the strait. 
Generally there are fundamental differences in the 
behaviors of JSs and SFs in the strait. Jarge merchant 
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ships are required to transit in designated shipping lanes 
according to the local maritime rules for navigation 
safety. They typically want to get to their destinations 
expeditiously to meet commercial deadlines. They are also 
required to transmit signal via I=>-mandated @IS to 
identify themselves. Hence, LSs typically enter the strait 
and proceed in the most direct and allowable route to their 
destinations (either the port or to the exit of the strait 
at the other end) in a predictable manner. LSs can be 
easily tracked by their @IS reports. Therefore, if a LS 
were to behave suspiciously by not conforming to the 
traffic rules, it would be easily picked out from the other 
shipping. If a LS threat were to conform to the behavior of 
the general shipping patterns, the only way that its 
possible ill intent can be discovered is by boarding for 
inspection.   
The SIs do not have such predictable behaviors. Their 
movements in the strait are not as well regulated and they 
do not typically follow well-defined shipping lanes. Some 
of them, such as fishing boats, loiter in an area within 
the strait for a certain period of time when engaging in 
their activities. Though the SIs are not required under I=> 
regulations to be equipped with @IS, the local maritime 
authority could mandate that those registered in their 
state carry similar identification systems. SIs registered 
in other states using this international strait may ignore 
this requirement. 
@s a result of the differences between the LS and SI 
threats, they will be considered separately and different 
J>N>LS will be developed for each of these threats. 
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con/or7 to a .tan8ar8 re9ortin+ 9roce8:re. The1 re9ort to 
the -ittora- .tate =e..e- Tra//ic Ser)ice >=TS? a:thoritie. 
@hen enterin+ an8 -ea)in+ the .trait.. 
Ahen a )e..e- re9ort. in2 the =e..e- Tra//ic 
Bn/or7ation S1.te7 >=TBS? .tart. tracCin+ the )e..e-2 an8 
it. 9a..a+e @i-- De 7onitore8 contin:o:.-1 :nti- it -ea)e. 
the .trait. En a8)anta+e o/ re9ortin+ in i. that the 
)e..e-. @i-- De 9ro)i8e8 @ith tra//ic an8 na)i+ationa- 
in/or7ation to a..i.t the7 in na)i+atin+ .a/e-1 thro:+h the 
.trait. 
The =TBS +et. in/or7ation on the tra//ic con8ition 
/ro7 the coa.ta- ra8ar.2 the EBS re9ort. an8 the )e..e-.F 
re9ort.. The .1.te7 o/ coa.ta- ra8ar. 9ro)i8e. co79-ete 
ra8ar co)era+e o/ the entire .trait2 inc-:8in+ in/or7ation 
on a )e..e-F. -ocation2 co:r.e an8 .9ee82 D:t it 8oe. not 
9ro)i8e in/or7ation on a )e..e-F. i8entit1. The EBS 
co79-e7ent. the coa.ta- ra8ar. D1 a:to7atica--1 9ro)i8in+ a 
)e..e-F. i8entit1 an8 9o.ition. The EBS tran.7it. the 
)e..e-F. 9o.ition2 hea8in+ an8 .9ee8 at "GH.econ8 
inter)a-.. The in/or7ation on )e..e- i8entit1 i. 
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$%e t%reat scenario t%at is e/a0ined in t%is t%esis is 
co00on a0on2st 0an3 coastal states es5eciall3 after t%e 
78"" terrorist attacks in t%e :.S. $%e 0ain concern is t%at 
terrorists =ill atte05t to >se ?essels carr3in2 dan2ero>s 
car2oes as =ea5ons to ca>se %ar0 to t%e ?>lnera@le %>0an 
5o5>lation or to ?al>a@le 5ro5erties. An t%is scenarioB 
terrorists %ijack a ?essel carr3in2 dan2ero>s car2oes and 
atte05t to @lo= it >5 in t%e %ar@or or to ra0 it into a 
@ert%ed or anc%ored ?esselB s>c% as a cr>ise liner or na?3 
=ars%i5.  
$%e t35es of ?essels t%at are likel3 to ca>se da0a2e 
akin to t%e de?astation of 78"" in s>c% a scenario are 
t%ose t%at carr3 dan2ero>s car2oes s>c% as liD>efied 
nat>ral 2as EFNHI and c%e0icals. Hencefort%B ?essels 
carr3in2 dan2ero>s car2oes =ill @e kno=n as D-?essels. 
Ho=e?erB not all =ill @e @oarded @3 Meds. 
At is ass>0ed t%atB if s>ccessf>ll3 @oardedB a D-
?essel is co?ertl3 %ijacked o>tside t%e strait. At is 
f>rt%er ass>0ed t%at onl3 t%e cre= of t%e D-?essel kno=s 
t%at t%e ?essel %as @een %ijacked. $%e %ijacked D-?essel 
atte05ts to contin>e its 5assa2e into t%e strait and 
>lti0atel3 into t%e 5ort. $%e %ijackers =ill atte05t to 
a?oid detection @3 co05l3in2 =it% all reD>ired V$S 
5rotocols >ntil t%e3 reac% a s>ita@le 5osition to e/ec>te 
t%eir 5lan of attack. 
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!. CONOPS )*+ D-.-/.0*1 *) H034/5-6 D-V-99-:9 
It is extremely difficult to detect a hijacked D-
vessel (called Red vessel henceforth) with merely standoff 
surveillance by UAB and radar, transiting under the false 
pretence of being a legitimate merchant. Ghe UAB, radars, 
and AIH can provide information on identity and position, 
but would never be able to reveal the true intent of the 
hijackers. As a result, the detection of such vessels 
reIuires verification of the intent of D-vessels, which is 
only possible with onboard inspection of all D-vessels and 
their crews. Jence in this scenario, the boarding parties 
on the PCs are the primary assets for the detection of Red 
vessels. Ghe UABs and UHBs are secondary assets because 
they are unable to conduct onboard inspections but they can 
be used for first level visual surveillance to complement 
the AIH. In the case where the BGIH is not receiving any 
information from the AIH of a particular vessel, the UABs 
or UHBs can be used to seek out its identity.   
All D-vessels transiting through the strait, including 
those that are not calling at the (M) port, can be 
potential targets of the hijackers. Jowever, there are a 
large number of them and boarding to inspect all of them 
would be impractical and cause delays to the traffic flow 
in the strait. Ghe littoral state (M) decides that only D-
vessels that are scheduled to call at the port will be 
considered for boarding and inspection. Ghe risk of 
terrorists using one of the other D-vessels, which are 
transiting the strait but not calling at the port, will 
have to be mitigated by other measures and will not be 
considered in this thesis. Nne such measure could be 
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$%t%rr%n)% t*rou-* t*% ran$om %0)ortin- o2 t*% 3a004t*rou-* 
546%00%l0. 
9 546%00%l )allin- at t*% 3ort :ill %nt%r t*% 0trait 
2rom %it*%r t*% %a0t or :%0t %n$ o2 t*% 0trait. 90 lon- a0 
a ;< i0 a6aila=l%> a 546%00%l )an =% =oar$%$ at an? 3oint 
2rom t*% %ntran)% o2 t*% 0trait to t*% %ntran)% o2 t*% 
3ort. 9 =oar$%$ 546%00%l )ontinu%0 to 3ro)%%$ to:ar$ t*% 
%ntran)% o2 t*% 3ort =ut i0 onl? allo:%$ to 3a00 t*rou-* 
t*% %ntran)% o2 t*% 3ort :*%n t*% in03%)tion i0 )om3l%t%$ 
an$ t*% 546%00%l *a0 =%%n )%rti2i%$ @0a2%A. 9 @0a2%A 54
6%00%l i0 on% t*at *a0 not =%%n *iBa)C%$. D3on )om3l%tion 
o2 an in03%)tion> t*% =oar$in- 3art? :ill -o =a)C to t*% 
;<> an$ t*% ;< :ill 3ro)%%$ to t*% n%Et a6aila=l% 546%00%l 
t*at *a0 not =%%n in03%)t%$. F2 t*% in03%)tion i0 not =%%n 
)om3l%t%$ =? t*% tim% t*% 546%00%l r%a)*%0 t*% %ntran)% o2 
t*% 3ort> t*% 546%00%l :ill =% *%l$ in a *ol$in- ar%a Gn%ar 
t*% %ntran)% o2 t*% 3ortH until t*% in03%)tion i0 )om3l%t%$ 
=? ot*%r 3%r0onn%l. 
 
!"# $S#&'()$#()*)+*,'-#'.#/,01+2)(#(34)SS)$S#!5#6+S#
Fn t*% 2ormulation o2 t*% anal?ti)al mo$%l> 0%6%ral 
a00um3tion0 a=out t*% 546%00%l0 ar% ma$%. 9ll 546%00%l0 
t*at )all at t*% 3ort ar% a00um%$ to =% t*% *iBa)C%r0I 
3ot%ntial tar-%t :ill *a6% to =% =oar$%$ an$ in03%)t%$. 9n? 
546%00%l t*at i0 i$%nti2i%$ a0 t*% J%$ 6%00%l i0 a00um%$ to 
=% a33r%*%n$%$ =? a r%03on0% 2or)%> an$ t*% t%rrori0t a)t 
t*%r%=? a6%rt%$. 5u% to t*% tim% taC%n 2or 3o0t4$%t%)tion 
r%03on0% a)tion0> 0u)* a0 0%n$in- 03%)ial 2or)%0 to 0torm 
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C. CONOPS (O) SB+ T-).ATS 
0. SB Traffic 6ana8e:ent in the Strait 
The littoral state utili/es a series of CSRs and 
mobile radars on its UAVs, USVs, and PCs to provide radar 
coverage for the entire strait. It can detect most SBs in 
the strait, but the present radar system is unable to 
provide identification of them. 
To circumvent this problem, the littoral state has 
mandated that all SBs registered in the state be equipped 
with automatic identification devices similar in function 
to the IGO mandated AIS. However, other SBs in the strait 
that are not registered in the littoral state are not 
required to carry such a device. 
When a SB in the strait is detected and identified, it 
is tagged in the VTIS. Once a SB is tagged, the VTIS has 
information of its location and identification. It remains 
tagged as long as one of the sensors (coastal radar, PC, 
USV, or UAV) continues to track itN otherwise it is 
considered Olost.P  When a SB that is OlostP is re-detected 
by a sensor, it is treated as a new detection.  A tagged SB 
is not known to be armed/hostile/Red without further 
investigation. 
 
=. Threat Scenario+ 
The hostile SB’s (called Red boat) aim and goal is to 
get within range of a High Value Target (HVT) which is 
either berthed in the littoral state’s (called Blue) harbor 
or transiting Blue’s strait. Once within range of the HVT, 
 "#
the Red boat will detonate explosives. Two possible SB 
threat scenarios will be addressed in this thesis. 
In the first scenario, the Red boat waits outside the 
strait at an ambush location for an opportunity to attack 
the AVT in the strait or harbor. The Red boat is not 
subjected to BlueDs surveillance when it is outside of 
BlueDs strait. At the time of attack, the Red boat will 
breach BlueDs waters in an attempt to reach or intercept 
the AVT within the shortest time by proceeding at high 
speed.     
In the second scenario, the Red boat conceals its 
intention to attack an AVT until the very last minute. Red 
boat could disguise itself to blend in with legitimate SB 
traffic in the strait. Red boat could also wait outside the 
strait at an ambush location for the opportunity to attack 
the AVT in the strait or harbor. Ghile proceeding toward 
the AVT for the attack, the Red boat will attempt to keep a 
low signature by proceeding at an inconspicuous speed, 
usually Huite slowly. In both situations, Red boatDs 
intention is to remain innocuous until the time of attack. 
 
!. A CONOPS *or D.t.0tion o* SB T5r.at 
The CSRs and landJbased KLMIR systems, complemented by 
the mobile sensors, are the primary means for the detection 
of SBs in the strait. In addition, the PCs, USVs, and UAVs 
are used to conduct preliminary investigations and provide 
identification of the SBs. This level of inspection (Type 
I) classifies the SBs as either friendly, neutral, or 
suspicious. Ghen Type I inspection determines that a SB is 
 30
suspicious, only a PC or a USV is able to determine if it 
is a threat through a Type >> inspection. Type >> 
inspections require the personnel on the PC to conduct 
boarding operations. A Type >> inspection for a USV has 
personnel situated at the C2 center ashore to communicate 
with personnel on the SB using a public address system on 
the USV. >f the suspicious SB is detected by the UAV, the 
neEt available PC or USV will be tasGed to investigate it. 
>n such situations, the UAV will continue to monitor the SB 
until the arrival of the PC or USV.  PCs and USVs engaged 
in Type > inspections can be reassigned to conduct Type >> 
inspections on another suspicious SBs. PCs that are used in 
the inspection of SBs differ from those used in the 
inspection of large dangerous vessels. Once a SB is 
determined to be a threat, resources for subsequent 
response actions are readily available. 
Ihen the VT>S loses tracG of a previously tagged SB, 
all information on the vessel is considered lost. TracG 
loss occurs when none of the radars is able to continue 
tracGing a SBJ this can happen in two ways. First, tracG 
loss can occur when the SB eEits the CSR coverage, which in 
our model means leaving the strait. Second, tracG loss of 
SBs that are within the CSR surveillance can result from 
other factors, such as the environmental clutter of rain 
and land. >f the same SB is subsequently re-detected, it is 
treated as a new target, and is subjected to the same 
inspection process again.  
>n the first SB threat scenario, once the Red boat is 
in the strait it will be considered suspicious because of 
its high speed. Any available Blue USVs or PCs immediately 
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#( ) = %umber of UAV (respectively USV) 





Vww! "  = Probability that, during a Type I 
inspection, a White SB is classified as harmless by a UAV 




 = Probability that a White SB is misclassified as 
suspicious by a UAV during a Type I inspection and must be 





= Probability that, during a Type I inspection, a 
White SB is classified as suspicious by a USV, and must 





V$$! " = Probability that the Red boat is 










, the more likely an idle UAV or respectively, USV, 
will investigate an unidentified suspicious SB rather than 








, the more 
likely a USV engaged in a Type I investigation will be 







#$! " = A model tuning factor applied 




















#$! ", the more quickly will Blue 
concentrate on suspicious SBs. 
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3&73&.&,0. 0%& 8%4,-& 2/,41+8. (' 0%& 1&4, ,619&3 (' :;. +, 
0%&+3 3&.7&80+<& .040&. (<&3 0+1&= >(0& 0%40 14,/?4)) 
@74341&0&3.A 14/ 9& 0+1&B2&7&,2&,0C 4))(*+,- 0%& 1(2&)+,- 
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    $%&#' 
(he follo.ing set of differential e7uations represents 
the change dynamics of the mean number of UAVs in their 





























































































































































































































































  $%&1() 
 "#
The following set of differential e3uations represents 
the change dynamics of the mean number of USVs in their 

























































































































































































































































































































   (%&1%) 
()uations (%&1) to (%&1%) are sub5ect to the following 




$( )" "% $( )" "& $( ) ! #
# " '
&
$( ) # '( $( ) " )'
# "*
&







      (%&1?) 
! "#
$%&'()*+,!-#./0!(*!-#.1#0!'23!,*4536!+&732)8'449!&,)+:!
)7;4373+('()*+! *<! (=3! $&432! 73(=*6! )+! >?@A?B! (*! 63(327)+3!
(=3!4)7)(,!*<!(=3!,('(3!5'2)'C43,.!
!
!" $%&'()*+, -*. /'.( 0012 /.*3'3)4)(5 *- 67(78()*+ 
-*. 9: ;<.7'( 987+'.)* 2 
D+!EB!(=23'(!,83+'2)*!?F!'!R36!C*'(!-!0!H')(,!*&(,)63!
(=3! ,(2')(! '(! '+! '7C&,=! 4*8'()*+! <*2! (=3! *;;*2(&+)(9! (*!
'(('8I! (=3! JK@! )+! (=3! ,(2')(! *2! ='2C*2.! L+83! !! ),! )+! (=3!
,(2')(! )(,! '8()*+,! H*&46! C3! ,)7)4'2! (*! (=*,3! *<! '!
,&,;)8)*&,! EB! '+6! )(! 8'+! C3! ,&CM38(36! (*! )+,;38()*+,.! ?!
,&,;)8)*&,! EB! 8'+! 3)(=32! C3! )+,;38(36! C9! '+! )643! NEK!(='(!
),!+*(!3+:':36!)+!'+9!(9;3!*<!)+,;38()*+F!*2!'!NEK!(='(!),!













F! )+! (=3! 23:)*+! H=3+! !!
3+(32,! (=3! ,(2')(,! C*(=! ='53! P*),,*+! 6),(2)C&()*+,! H)(=!



























































+&7C32! *<! NEK,! !
V! "! (='(! '23! )643! '+6! +*(! 3+:':36! )+! '+9!
 "#
$%&'()*$+% ,-(% ! .//$0(& -.& . 1$%+2$.3 4$&*/$56*$+% ,$*- 



































$" #= *-( (&*$2.*( +7 *-( '/+5.5$3$*< . 89V $& $43( 











> ?&&62( *-( 
%625(/ +7 56&< 89V& *-.* ./( (%@.@(4 $% A<'( B $%&'()*$+%& 
.%4 ./( /(.&&$@%(4 *+ $%&'()* . &6&'$)$+6& 91 ,-(% ! 
.//$0(& !
!! " -.& .% $%4('(%4(%* 1$%+2$.3 4$&*/$56*$+% ,$*- 
%625(/ +7 */$.3& *-( %625(/ +7 56&< 89V&= *-( (&*$2.*( +7 
*-( '/+5.5$3$*< *-.* . 89V $& (%@.@(4 $% . A<'( B 














= 89V& (%@.@(4 $% A<'( B 






































A-( D+$%* '/+5.5$3$*< +7 *-( %625(/ +7 89V .0.$3.53( 







































'%'( EG>H"F  
7+/  " .%4  b %+%%(@.*$0( $%*(@(/& &.*$&7<$%@ 
 !







 &6&'$)$+6& 91& .%4 *-( !; *-( %(I* 
&6&'$)$+6& 91 *+ 5( $%0(&*$@.*(4 $& )-+&(% .* /.%4+2= (.)- 
! ""
#$%&'$(%)%'&!*#*+%,%-#*!./!%*!'0#1223!2%4'23!(-!5'!,6-*'$7!





















































































































































































! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! >?7@AB!
;**#C'! (61(! (6'! (%C'! !! (14'*! (-! (=19'2! 1,=-**! (6'!
='D%-$! (-! (6'! (1=D'(! %*! 1! =1$&-C! 91=%152'E! !
!!"
7! F%9'$! a !
G.H*!1='!%&2'!1$&! ! !G.H*!'$D1D'&!%$!I3+'!J!%$*+',(%-$*!1='!
='1**%D$'&E! 1**#C'! (61(! (6'! G.H*! (61(! :%22! %$*+',(! 1!









































=%&! 9-3,(*(-327! +'-626(7(*>! *%2*! 2! /01! '&29%&)! !!
6&.-'&! !! 8&*)! 29'-))! *%&! '&8(-3:! 8(?&3! ! ! "! /01)! 2'&!
2))(83&,! *-! )4)+(9(-4)! ?&))&7)! ()! 2++'-@(52*&,! 6>!
 !
" "! #$% !"
# &$
%&&! ""
$& A# $#$ %&<!
A&*! !
"
! 6&! *%&! &?&3*! (3! $%(9%! !! ()! 9%-)&3! *-! 6&!
(3)+&9*&,! 23,! 23! (,7&! /01! '&29%&)! !! 6&.-'&! !! 8&*)! 29'-))!




























#$%&'&()(*+ *,'* -./0 $1'5,
= &1>%$1 = ?1*0 *% *'$?1*





























































#$%&'&()(*+ *,'* -./0 $1'5,
= &1>%$1 = ?1*0 *% *'$?1*




























! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! DE<FGH!
!
! "#
!" $%&'()*+, -*. /'.( 0012 /.*3'3)4)(5 *- 67(78()*+ 
-*. 92 T;.7'( 987+'.)* 2 
! $%! &'(! )*! &'+(,&! -.(%,+/0!*1! R! 2/33! (%&(+! &'(! +(4/0%!
,%5! ,&&(67&! &0! 83(%5! /%! 2/&'! 0+! '/5(! ,60%4! &'(! 0&'(+!









-9-7/./09-1! R! /-! %(9&+,3/@(5! /:! ,! >)?! /-! ,B,/3,83(! &0!
/%-7(.&!/&;!C'(%!R!8(.06(-!-9-7/./09-1!R!6,=!8(!%(9&+,3/@(5!












" ! " #! " ! 1;! ! H<'(! 7+08,8/3/&=! R! /-! -98I(.&(5! &0! <=7(! $!
/%-7(.&/0%!,&!&/6(! t !/-!
 !










%! "  $ %&'( ()*+&, -. /A12 23'4-56(7 ! 't t6*& t  





t! " $ %&'( ()*+&, -. /;12 6( ?,-<&22 -. 64&(t6.>6(7 




t! " $ %&'( ()*+&, -. /;12 &(7'7&4 6( =>?& @@ 
6(2?&<t6-( -( ! 't t6*& ! D 






t" # $ #& t" # $ #$ "' t" # $ #& "' t" #D 






t" # $#$$ t" # $#$ "& t" # $#$$ "& t" #D 
 
 "#
!" Differential -.uations for 2robability of 
Detection in Scenario B 
$%& '())(*+,- .&/ (' &012/+(,. 3&43&.&,/. /%& 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    $%&%#' 
(he follo.ing set of differential e7uations represents 
the change dynamics of the mean number of UAVs in their 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The following set of differential e3uations represents 
the change dynamics of the mean number of USVs in their 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 $%& '())(*+,- &./01+(, 2&32&4&,14 1%& 201& (' 5%0,-& 




# ! $$% !"$% !" t! "&$''
"#$% %'()#* +, 
-.//#% 0#/ t-$t .2 345/
$2 2'26.7.+'2 )8 U:; 
$,t#* <86# 3 .%26#7t.+%
! "## $##
! " $ ($ ! )$ t! "#$ %&
%& ' =! *
!'$
W, t! "



























"#$% %'()#* +, U:;2 t-$t $**.># $t -.//#% 0#/ )#.%? ,+@@+A#/ )8 UB;2
! "############## $##############
! " $ $% t! " %$% !" t! "#$ %&& ' *
!'$,
($ !)$ t! "#$ %&
%




























"#$% %'()#* +, U:;2 #%?$?#/ .% <86# 3 .%26#7t.+% t-$t $*#
































$! "  02& 1%& 
5(22&43(,8+,- 41&087 4101& 90)/&4 '2(: &./01+(,4 <=;A? 1( 

















%09& +,+1+0) 5(,8+1+(, &./0) 1( D&2(; 
 
R t! " %04 90)/& (,& 04 
+14 +,+1+0) 5(,8+1+(,;  
E./01+(,4 <=;B#? 1( <=;=>? 02& 4()9&8 ,/:&2+50))7 
/4+,- 1%& 0/1%(2F4 +:3)&:&,101+(, (' 1%& E/)&2 :&1%(8 +, 
GH$IHJ 1( 8&1&2:+,& 1%& )+:+14 (' 1%& 4101& 902+06)&4; 
! "#






! '(! !! ! "








#( ) # !! $ %$( )"# $% $ $ %$( )"# $%! "&( )! ! ! ! AB4CDE!
!
!. $easure of ,ffectiveness 











$%&! '()*&! +%,-! ./01! 2%)&(2! m45&'! 46! 7%(-2&)! 8! ,+!
&9&)7,+&5!64)!:(';&+!46!m45&'!-()(m&2&)+!2%(2!64)m!(!n&()'=!
4)2%4*4n('!/(2,n!%=-&)7;>&!5&+,*n!.0(n7%&?!8@@"1A!$%&!m45&'!
,+! &9&)7,+&5! (2! 2%&+&! -()(m&2&)! :(';&+! 24! 5&2&)m,n&! 2%4+&!
-()(m&2&)+!.6(724)+1!2%(2!%(:&!2%&!m4+2!(66&72!4n!2%&!m45&'!
4;2-;2!.2%&!-)4>(>,',2=!46!n&;2)(',?,n*!(!%,B(7C&5!/01A!!D2!
,+! ('+4! ;+&5! 24! 5&2&)m,n&! 2%&! &66&72+! 2%(2! :()=,n*! 2%&!
n;m>&)!46!+;>E)&*,4n+F!nF!(n5!2%&!n;m>&)!46!+&):,7&!-&),45+F!
"F! %(:&! 4n! 2%&! m45&'! 4;2-;2A! $%&! 6(724)+! ()&! :(),&5! 4:&)!
)(n*&+!2%(2!()&!(++&++&5!24!>&!',C&'=!-)(72,7('!:(),(2,4n+!
,n! 2%&! GE:&++&'! 2)(66,7! (n5! 2%&! HIJ+! 4-&)(2,4n('!






2%&! 42%&)! -()(m&2&)+A! $%&! HI+! ()&! 5,+2),>;2&5! ;n,64)m'=!
4:&)! 2%&! +;>E)&*,4n+A! N%&n! (! GE:&++&'! 2)(:&'+! 2%)4;*%! (!
+;>E)&*,4n!;n,n+-&72&5F!4n'=!2%&!HI+!,n!2%&!+;>+&O;&n2!+;>E
)&*,4n+! %(:&! (! 7%(n7&! 24! ,n+-&72! ,2F! ,n5&-&n5&n2! 46! 2%&!
-)&:,4;+!+;>E)&*,4n+A!$%;+!64)!'()*&! ! F!2%&!2,m&!;n2,'!2%&!
GE:&++&'! ,+! ,n+-&72&5! %(+! (--)49,m(2&'=! (n! &9-4n&n2,('!




<%/&%5! +*,3%,! ! ! .*)! -.%! %11%&-! '1! ,%:0&4/3! -.%! &.*/&%! '1!
4/)6%&-4/3! *! 829%))%+;! =.%! %11%&-! '1! ! ! '/! -.%! (':%+>)!




).465!%E&%6-!?.%/! M !F;!G.%/! ! !F5!.43.%,! ! !,%)0+-)!4/!*!




*!&'/)-*/-;!=.%!9*+0%)!1',! ! !*/:! m !0)%:!4/!-.%!,%(*4/:%,!
'1!-.4)!-.%)4)!*,%!! ! IJ!1',!*++!9*+0%)!'1!ML!! MN!1',!! ! FL!
*/:! m M#! 1',! ! ! F;! =.%)%! 9*+0%)! ?%,%! &.')%/! $%&*0)%! -.%7!
,%)0+-! 4/! 6%))4(4)-4&! 9*+0%)! 1',! -.%! 6,'$*$4+4-7! '1!
:%-%&-4'/!O)%%!P66%/:4E!Q!1',!:%-*4+)R;!=.%)%!,%)0+-)!*+)'!
)033%)-! -.*-! 4/! *! .43.%,! ,%)'+0-4'/! (':%+! 4-! 4)! 4(6',-*/-!
-'! ,%6,%)%/-! -.%! :4)-,4$0-4'/! '1! -4(%! -.*-! *! ST! 4)!
*9*4+*$+%!1',!4/)6%&-4'/L!4-!4)!+%))!4(6',-*/-!-'!,%6,%)%/-!
-.%! :4)-,4$0-4'/! '1! -.%! )%,94&%! -4(%! 41! -.%! /0($%,! '1! @A)!
&'/)4:%,%:!4)!)(*++;!
=.%! ,%)0+-)! :4)6+*7%:! 4/! P66%/:4E! Q! )033%)-! -.*-! -.%!
(')-!)43/414&*/-!1*&-',!4/!:%-%,(4/4/3!-.%!6,'$*$4+4-7!-.*-!
U%:!9%))%+!4)!:%-%&-%:!OP "! "R!4)!-.%!/0($%,!'1!*&-49%!@A)!
O!R! 4/! -.%! )-,*4-;! =.%! /%E-! (')-! )43/414&*/-! 1*&-',)! *,%!
-.%!*,,49*+!,*-%!'1!829%))%+)!O! R!1'++'?%:!$7!-.%!,*-%!*-!




$%&'( 1*! +%,%-(.(, /%'0(1 23, 4%1( 5%1( 67 -38('* 
!"#"$%&%#' ()$*+,' -",.%'
9(%: .;-( 2,3- <=/(11(' (:.,> .3 ,(?;3: %:8 

















G,,;/%' ,%.( 32 <=/(11('1 .3 1.,%;. CA(, 
B30,D 
!  EHIEF ! H*J# 
K0-&(, 32 10&=,(?;3:1 ;: .B( 1.,%;. !  1H 
K0-&(, 32 1(,/;@( .;-( A(,;381 ;: % &3%,8;:? 
%:8 ;:1A(@.;3: A,3@(11 
!  
J 23, ! ! # 
E 23, ! ! # 
 
! "#
!"# $%&'()&)*+,-.#/00)1+#%0#M #,*2#! #




&)! /%,! '/8(&/! /2! (1%&,;,! (!
 
P K( ) ! A>FA! 20! 4,/,1/&)G! /%,!
%&H(1I,4! <=;,'',*>! $%&'! ()(*+'&'! 4,/,8.&),'! %25! /%,! P "! "!
1%()G,'!5%,)!/%,!(;,8(G,!)3.7,8!20!(88&;(*'!8()G,'!082.!JA!
/2!#A!<=;,'',*'!B,8!4(+6!! !&'!;(8&,4!082.!J!/2!JA6!()4!(**!













































$%e conto+r plot of ! "! "0 d23played 2n 627+re "0 
2nd2cate3 t%at t%ere 23 a nearly l2near relat2on3%2p 
8et9een !  and ! 2n ma2nta2n2n7 a 72;en le;el of ! "! ". 6or 
e;ery 2ncrement of =.> 2n arr2;al rate ?or 2ncrement of @.A 
BC;e33el3 per dayD0 an add2t2onal EC 23 reG+2red to 
ma2nta2n ! "! " approH2mately =.I= or %27%er. J2t% 32H EC3 
act2;e 2n t%e 3tra2t0 t%e arr2;al rate of KL3 may 8e a3 




$%23 analy323 eHam2ne3 t%e effect3 on t%e o+tcome of 





t%e mean t2me 8oard2n7 party from EC 23 on a BC;e33el0 are 
;ar2ed at t%e 3ame t2me. !  23 ;ar2ed from M to N 9%2le all 
ot%er factor3 eHcept ! are Oept at t%e2r 8a3e ca3e ;al+e3 
a3 2n $a8le M. 
6rom t%e conto+r plot d23played 2n 627+re N0 2t can 8e 
determ2ned %o9 m+c% ! %a3 to 2ncrea3e 2n order to allo9 
red+ct2on 2n !. Pn t%e 8a3e ca3e 92t% µQ=.>#0 32H EC3 are 
reG+2red to ac%2e;e P "! "R=.I= of detect2n7 t%e %2SacOed BC
;e33el. Pf only f2;e EC3 are a;a2la8le0 t%en µ m+3t 8e at 
lea3t =.3 to ac%2e;e ! "! "R=.I=U t%at 23 a red+ct2on of 
a8o+t ! 3 %o+r 2n t%e mean t2me taOen 8y t%e per3onnel 
on8oard a EC to 8oard and 2n3pect BC;e33el3 ! "! ". $o 
ma2nta2n t%e 3ame le;el of ! "! "0 e;ery +n2t decrement 2n ! 
 ""
#$%&'#$( )* $+,-*$*.')/ '*0#$1$*. '* !2 3. '( 4'55'0&/. '* 
,#)0.'0$ .- 4$0#$)($ .6$ 1$)* '*(,$0.'-* .'1$2 76&(8 .6'( 
1-4$/ (&99$(.( 4$0#$)('*9 .6$ 1$)* :; '*(,$0.'-* .'1$ 6)( ) 
/'1'.$4 ,#)0.'0)/ $55$0. '* #$4&0'*9 !2 3* (&11)#<8 '5 ) 
6'96 /$=$/ -5 ($)#06 #).$8 !8 '( )06'$=)>/$ ?6$* >-)#4'*98 








































@'9&#$ A2 ;-*.-&# ,/-. -5 .6$ ,#->)>'/'.< .6). .6$ B$4 
=$(($/ '( 4$.$0.$4 =$#(&( .6$ *&1>$# -5 :;( )0.'=$ '* 
.6$ (.#)'. )*4 .6$ :; ($#='0$ #).$C ! DE2FG2  
 
!" $%&'()*+%n %- ./0 10.0)&*n*+.*2 345*6 M%604 (n6 8 
9*)./:10(./ M%604 
76'( )*)/<('( '( ) 0-1,)#'(-* >$.?$$* .6$ #$(&/.( 5#-1 
.6$ 4$.$#1'*'(.'0 5/&'4 HI@J 1-4$/ 4$(0#'>$4 '* ;6),.$# K 
)*4 .?- =$#('-*( -5 ) (.-06)(.'0 >'#.6L4$).6 HMIJ 1-4$/2 
76$ MI 1-4$/( #$,#$($*. .6$ $55$0. -5 ;NON:P -5 '*(,$0.'-* 
! "#
$%! &'(! )(! )! *+,-.! )/0! 01)-.! 2,$31((! $%! )! (4(-15! 6+-.!
2,$31((1(! -.)-! .)71! -+51(! *1-611/! 171/-(! -.)-! ),1!
182$/1/-+)994! 0+(-,+*:-10;! <.1! (13$/0! 71,(+$/! $%! -.1! =>!
5$019(! +(! )! ?1/1,)9+@)-+$/! $%! -.1! %+,(-! 6+-.! -.1! (-,)+-!
0+7+010! +/-$! )! /:5*1,! $%! (:*A,1?+$/(;! >1(3,+2-+$/(! $%! -.1!
-6$!71,(+$/(!$%!-.1!=>!5$019(!),1!+/!B221/0+8!C;!<.1!7)9:1(!
:(10! %$,! -.1! 2),)51-1,(! +/! -.+(! )/)94(+(! ),1! -.1! ()51! )(!
-.$(1! 0+(29)410! +/! <)*91! DE! 18312-! %$,! -.1! /:5*1,! $%!(:*A
,1?+$/(!)/0!(1,7+31!21,+$0(;!
!" $!%& '( )* +,-&. /&0%1% 2) +,-&. ' 32)4'5 
F+?:,1! G! 0+(29)4(! -.1! 29$-! $%! -.1! 2,$*)*+9+-4!
-.)-! -.1! H10! 71((19! +(! +/(213-10! 71,(:(! -.1! /:5*1,! $%!
)3-+71!IC(!+/!-.1!(-,)+-!%$,!*$-.!5$019(;!F$,!3$/(+(-1/34E!
-.1! >F! 5$019! .)(! -.1! /:5*1,! $%! (:*A,1?+$/(E!  n=DE! )/0! -.1!
/:5*1,! $%! (1,7+31! 21,+$0(E!  "=D;! F,$5! F+?:,1! GE! +-! +(!
$*(1,710! -.)-! -.1! =>AD! 5$019! ,1(:9-(! ),1! 5$,1! 21((+5+(-+3!
-.)/! -.$(1! $%! -.1! >F! 5$019! %$,! )99!  M ;! <.1! 3:,71! %$,! =>!
5$019! 0$1(! /$-! ,+(1! )(! ,)2+094! )(! -.1! >F! $/1! 6.1/! !" !
+/3,1)(1(;! <.1! 9),?1(-! 0+%%1,1/31E! +/! 21,31/-)?1E! *1-611/!
-.1! ,1(:9-(! $%! -.1! -6$! 5$019(! +(! )-!  " =K! 6.1,1! -.1! =>AD!
5$019L(!,1(:9-!+(!)95$(-!MNO!9$61,;!<.+(!(:??1(-(!-.)-!-.1!





























$ig'(e #. Plot o/ p(o1a1ility t4at t4e 5ed 7essel is 
dete9ted 7e(s's t4e n'm1e( PCs a9ti7e in t4e st(ait 
/o( t4e dete(ministi9 /l'id model and 1i(t4-deat4 
model >? @it4  "A> and  mA>. 
 
b. Case 2) DF ,odel versus 3D ,odel 2 43D-26 
$ig'(e B plots t4e p(o1a1ility t4at t4e 5ed 
7essel is inspe9ted 7e(s's t4e n'm1e( o/ a9ti7e PCs in t4e 
st(ait /o( 1ot4 models. C4e D$ model and t4e BD-2 model 
1ot4 4a7e t4e n'm1e( o/ s'1-(egions eG'al to t4e n'm1e( o/ 
PCs?  " ! # ? and t4e n'm1e( o/ se(7i9e pe(iods?  "A>. C4e(e 
is one PC pe( s'1-(egion. $(om $ig'(e B it is o1se(7ed t4at 
1ot4 models p(od'9e 7e(y simila( (es'lts. C4e BD-2 model? 
@4i94 is a gene(aliHed 7e(sion o/ BD->? gi7es slig4tly mo(e 
optimisti9 (es'lts t4an t4e BD-> model. C4e (es'lt o/ t4is 
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Figure 12. -ontour plot of the probability that Red is 
inspected in scenario A versus the suspicious SB 


































Figure 13. -ontour plot of the probability that Red is 
inspected in scenario B versus the suspicious SB 
priority parameters for UAV and USV. 
 76
Figure 14 displays the plot of the probability Red is 
inspected and identified as Red versus the number of active 




=300. It is observed that for 
a small number of USVs (less than three), the addition of a 
UAV actually causes ! "
A! " to drop. The liJely cause is that 
a small number of USVs (or PLs) can be overwhelmed by the 
additional worJload created by the UAVs; when a UAV 
misclassifies a neutral SB (Ohite) as suspicious, a USV or 
PL must travel to the SB and perform a Type II inspection.  
Lonsequently, there are fewer idle USVs (or PLs) to detect 
Red, which results in lower ! "
#! ". This phenomenon is 
liJely to be more apparent when the surface platforms are 
less effective, such as under poor visibility conditions. 
Figure 15 displays the corresponding plot of mean number of 
USVs not engaged in any inspection versus the number of 
those active in the region under the same conditions as in 
Figure 14. For three or fewer active USVs, it is observed 
that the addition of one UAV causes a significant drop in 
number of available USVs. A USV is said to be available if 
it is not engaging in an inspection or it has been 
reassigned from a Type I inspection to a Type 2 inspection. 
Ohen the second UAV is added, the number of available USVs 
drops further, though not as much as for the first. Ohen 
there is a sufficient number of USVs to deal with the 
worJload generated by the UAVs, each USV addition increase 
the availability of USVs, as observed in Figure 15 for a 
number of USVs greater than three. It is further observed 
in Figure 15 that when there is no UAV, there is only a 
marginal increase in the mean number of available USVs when 
the number of active USVs increases. This marginal increase 
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Figure 1+. -lot of probability that Red is inspected in 
scenario A versus the USV reassignAent paraAeter for 








Ehe platforAsF accuracies in classifying unsuspicious 
White boats are Aodeled as the probability of correctly 
classifying unsuspicious SBs. Ehe classification paraAeters 








I respectively. Ehis 
analysis coApares hoJ the accuracy of the classification of 
White boats by the UAV and USV affects the probability of 
inspecting the Red boat. Ehe paraAeters Jill taKe values 
froA 0.5 to 1.0I Jhich is deeAed an operationally 
reasonable range. As beforeI the basis of this analysis 
Jill be an MRBAE AiN of one UAV and nine USVs and good 
visibility conditions for all other paraAeters. Ehe 
paraAeter values are displayed in Eable O. 
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Figure 20. 0lot of the probability that Red is 
inspected in scenario = versus the number of active 
USVs for different Red hidden times under #a% good 
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$( ) as long as there is no decrease in the 
probability of correct classification. @nce againA the 
effects of variability in the inspection times are not 























































Figure 2E. Contour plot of the probability that Ged is 
inspected in scenario H versus 123 mean inspection 
times for 8ype ; and 8ype ;; inspectionsA under good 
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%n order to achieve ! "
A( )1#.3 under good visibility 
conditions and with no UAV contribution, at least nine USVs 
or eight PCs are required to be deployed in the strait. 
Under poor visibility conditions, P "
A! " for nine USVs or 
eight PCs (without a UAV) drops by almost H#I to #.JK for 
USVs and #.L# for PCs. The contribution of UAVs in 
improving ! K
A! " is not very significant; each additional 
UAV is equivalent to about one USV or PC for cases of 
! "
A! "1#.3 for both good and poor visibility. Furthermore, 
UAVs are more costly to acquire and operate than USVs or 
PCs; see Table J.  
Figure H# displays the plots of scenario BQs ! "
#! " 
versus the number of USVs active in the strait under good 
and poor visibility conditions. The three curves on each 
plot are for the cases with no UAV, one UAV, and two UAVs 
deployed. Figure H1 displays similar plots for PCs. %n 
general, it is observed that the UAVs are making a higher 
contribution in scenario B compared to scenario A. For 
example, for eight USVs, two UAVs increase P "
B! " by #.11 
(about a 1$I increment) compared to an increment of #.#L or 
about KI in ! "
A! ". The UAVsQ higher rate of inspection for 
Whites is assisting in detecting the Red while it is hidden 
among the other Whites. Vowever, even with the larger 
contribution, each additional UAV remains equivalent to 
about one USV or PC. %n order to achieve ! "
#! "1#.3 under 
good visibility conditions and no UAV contribution, at 
least 1# USVs or eight PCs are required. When compared with 
scenario A, one additional USV is required; for PCs, the 
number required remains the same. %n scenario B, Red is 
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)igure /0.! 2lot of probability that SB threat is 
detected in scenario A against the number of active 
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-./01+ 2$3  %&'4%,'3  5678 " 87 9 7, :17(&(.6.8; 7, 
*+8+)8.7< =+1>0> 8?+ <0@(+1 7, >0(41+/.7<>A ! ! ,71 
=&1.70> <0@(+1> 7, >+1=.)+ 8.@+ :+1.7*>A ! 3 
 "#$



























































































































































-)&./0 123 %&'4%l'3  5l67 8 76 "# 69 :/6;<;)l)7= 69 
>070?7)6@ A0/B.B 7(0 @.C;0/ 69 B.;4/0&)6@BD ! ! 96/ A</)6.B 
@.C;0/B 69 B0/A)?0 7)C0 :0/)6>BD ! 3 
 "#$
!






































































































































,-./01 234 %&'5%+'4  67)8 "2 8) "9 ): *0);<;-7-8= ): 
>181?8-)( @10A/A 8B1 (/&;10 ): A/;501.-)(AC ! C :)0 @<0-)/A 
(/&;10A ): A10@-?1 8-&1 *10-)>AC ! 4 
! "#$
!" $%&'%(%)*'+ ,*)+-./ %' +01 2$ 3-415 
%&'()*! +,! -.)! /+0)'! 1&2&/)-)2*! 3+4*50)2)0! &11)&2! 54!
6&7')! 89! 6.)! :&'()*! +,! -.)*)! 1&2&/)-)2*! ,+2/! &! 4)&2';!
+2-.+<+4&'!=&-54!.;1)23(7)!0)*5<4!(?&43.)@!#AAB)9!6.)!/+0)'!
2)*('-*! &2)! *(//&25@)0! 7;! &! '54)&2! 2)<2)**5+4! D5-.!
)E1'&4&-+2;! :&25&7')*! -.)! /+0)'! 1&2&/)-)2*! ! F! ! F! !F! ! F!
&40! ! G!-.)!2)*('-54<!HI*J(&2)!:&'()!5*!A98B9!6.)!)*-5/&-)*!
+,!-.)!3+),,535)4-*!&40!-.)52!*5<45,53&43)!54!-.)!/+0)'!&2)!
05*1'&;)0! 54! K5<(2)! LM9! 6.)! 1+';4+/5&'! &40! 54-)2&3-5+4!
-)2/*! &2)! 3)4-)2)0! &-! -.)! /)&4*! +,! -.)! 3+22)*1+4054<!
5405:50(&'!,&3-+2*9!
6.)! ,&3-+2!  " !! -.)! 4(/7)2! +,! NO*F! 5*! -.)! /+*-!
*5<45,53&4-!54!-.5*!/+0)'F!,+''+D)0!7;!-.)!&225:&'!2&-)!+,!











T&'S P*+, 'S 'NT,NT'.N*LL0 L,1T 2L*N3 
 1#$
!PP#$%&' )* )+MP!-&.+$ +/ 01# %#0#-M&$&.0&) /23&% 
M+%#2 !$% ! 4&-015%#!01 M+%#2 +/ 01# 2!-6# .1&P 
P-+42#M 
%&' (o*'+, -r','/0'* 1/ 0&1, 2--'/*13 2r' r'-ro*45'* 
fro( 2 7or81/9 -2-'r :; <2='r 2/* >25o:, ?#00ABC 
 
!7 M+%#2 )58* ! 0&M#51+M+6#$#+3. M!-9+:;4&-015%#!01 
:#-.&+$ +/ 2!-6# .1&P M+%#2 
D4--o,' 0&'r' 2r' 
! 
L "! " 4/E1/,-'50'* +2r9' ,&1-, ?FD,B 
1/ 0&' ,0r210 20 01('  " G 
! 
" "! " # "# 1# %#"# #$ % C Hor ,1(-+1510; 
 " ! ! 52/ :' 0o+'r20'*C 
 
F'0 0&' -ro:2:1+10; 0&20 0&'r' 2r'  "  FD, 20 01('  " I 




 FD, 2, 0&' 1/1012+ 5o/*101o/ 7&'/ !" J0 :'  
 
" L #( ) = $ L "( ) = $"{ }      ?KC1BC 
 
87 0<=>?@t@o> P<oC=C@l@t@E?  
%&' 0r2/,101o/ -ro:2:1+101', :'07''/ ,020', for 
!
" "! " 
2r' *1,-+2;'* 1/ 0&' 'L4201o/, ?KC#B 2/* ?KCMBC 
! 
" " # ! $#" # $ % !" " #" # $ %% & $ ! %$# ! o $#" #    ?KC#B 
No0' 0&1, 9'/'r2+1O', Po1,,o/ 2rr1=2+, ,1/5' 1f 
 
" t! " # L $ "  




 1, 0&' r20' of 2rr1=2+ of 
FD,I 91='/  "  4/1/,-'50'* FD, 2r' 1/ ,0r210 20 01('  " C 
! 1#$
! 
" " # ! $#" # $ % !" " #" # $ %% &
$
'%$# ! & $#" # !!!!!!!!!!!!#$%!& " % " '
''$# ! # % ! '$% &'
!






































,C>=,//,/! +-,! =4+,! *5! /,=?.0,! 9-,3! +-,=,! 4=,! 1*=,! +-43!
,3*A7-! 8&/D! +-,! /,0*3<! =,>=,/,3+/! +-,! /.+A4+.*3! .3! 9-.0-!
4@@!  " ! 8&/! 4=,! *00A>.,<! 43<! /*! +-,! =,14.3<,=! *5! +-,! :;/E!
 
" "! " ! # E! ,/04>,! +-,! =,7.*3! %,'7'! =,40-! +-,! >*=+(! 4+!
.3<.?.<A4@!=4+,!! '!
!
!. $ong(r*n + ,teady(,tate ,ol*tion 
:,+!!





dt " o dt# $ % P L t " dt# $ % l !" L t# $ % l& ' #$% l " "
%
!ldt " o dt# $ #$% & # l # '
!'dt " $ l ! '%& '(
"











! # " "" # ! "$ %! ! ! ! ! ! ! 45678!


















































     ! 456G86!
!
!. $%&'('ili+, &- ./+/0+i12 3/4 5/66/l 
M!C&H!L&22&'!4%(j1@O&H!PQ8!&+t&.2!t%&!2t.1(t6!P&t! " !0&!
t%&! &L&+t! t%1t! t%&! C&H! L&22&'! (2! H&t&@t&H6! J/.! t%&!
-1.1)&t&.2! 4.1t&28! >2&H! %&.&=! t%&! C&H! L&22&'! (2! H&t&@t&H!
9%&+!t%&!+>)0&.!/<!>+R(+2-&@t&H!PQ2!(2!'&22!t%1+!t%&!+>)0&.!
/<! 1@t(L&! K52! (+! t%&! 2t.1(t! 9%&+! C&H! &+t&.2! t%&! 2t.1(t6!!
S&+@&=! t%&! -./010('(t:! /<! H&t&@t(+,! C&H! L&22&'! </.!  " !
1@t(L&!K52!(2!
 !
" # $! " # ! %
%#0
$ "#
# ! ! ! ! ! 456T86!
M+! ()-/.t1+t! ,&+&.1'(I1t(/+=! +/t! @/L&.&H! %&.&=! H&1'2!
9(t%!2t.&1)2!/.!2>.,&2!/<!C&H!&+t.1+t2!0/>+H!</.!t%&!-/.t6!
! "#$
!"# $%&'(# )*+,# -# .'/'0-(12'&# 31$'*4%$%.'/'%56# 76'5&%*#
$-08%9:!1034*&'-34# 9'061%/# %;# (-0.'# 6417# $%&'(# <134#
6'=5'/31-(#65!*0'.1%/6#
%&'! ()*+,)! ,(! -'.)! (/01,2,1'1! ,-)3!  "! 43-),5/3/(! (/06
*'5,3-(! )*+2'*('1! ('7/'-),+889:! ;')! ! "! "! ! 0'! )&'! -/<0'*! 3=!
/-6,-(>'4)'1! ;?(! ,-! (/06*'5,3-!  j @!  
" ! "# $# %# "# #( ):! ;?(! '-)'*!
)&'! ()*+,)! ,-! (/06*'5,3-! ":! ;')! !" ! 0'! )&'! -/<0'*! 3=! AB(!
















%$ ! ' %$" # $%& j $ 1
n# l

































%$ ! ' %$" #             #$% & " & # " ( #
'(
#


















#" #%$ ! ' %$" #
  *+,""-, 
.//&01%23(%04 05 (67 8%2%(%49 :%'(&%;<(%04 *assuming 

























1( ) #$2 1( ) # ... #$"
#
1( )









#( ) #$2 #( ) # ... #$"
#
#( )















 %' 3 40&238%@%49 A04'(34( 3' %4 (67 B0:78 +C" %4 
(6%' 3//74:%1 *'327 8%2%(%49 :%'(&%;<(%04 ;<( ?%(6  "!  














































! $ ! M




$ for # $ 0   %&'"()' 
 
*+, -./01023245 16 ,64,.267 8,9 2: 9,4,;4,9 2: 

































APPEN%I' %) *OST ESTI.ATES 
A/ PLATFO2. A*34ISITION *OST 
%&' ()*+,-,.,/0 )/-. '-.,1(.'- 2/3 '()& /2 .&' 
45(.2/31- (3' 6(-'7 /0 (8(37'7 )/0.3().- /2 -,1,5(3 
45(.2/31- ,0 3')'0. 9'(3- /3 43/:3(1 3'4/3.-;   
A))/37,0: ./ ( 3'4/3. 23/1 .&' =,3' S)/+. UAV 43/:3(1A 
'()& UAV +0,. ,- '-.,1(.'7 ./ )/-. =BCDDE USFG;H 1,55,/0 
IDefense Industry DailyA CDDEJ;   
%&' +0,. )/-. /2 .&' K(2('5 P3/.')./3 USV ,- 
+0(M(,5(65' ,0 /4'0 -/+3)'- (07 &(- ./ 6' '-.,1(.'7 23/1 
.&' )/-. /2 /.&'3 USV-; N0 CDDOA ( USF"C;E 1,55,/0 )/0.3(). 
8(- (8(37'7 ./ 43/M,7' 2/+3 USV- 2/3 .&' P,../3(5 C/16(. 
S&,4R- IPCSJ A0.,SS+61(3,0' T(32(3' IASTJ U,--,/0 U/7+5'; 
N. ,- (--+1'7 &'3' .&(. .&' PCSR- USV 8,.& .&' AST 4(95/(7 
,- -,1,5(3 ,0 )/-. ./ .&' P3/.')./3 USV 8,.& VWXNKA (07 
3(7(3 -'0-/3-A (07 ( -1(55 )(5,6'3 8'(4/0 -9-.'1; Y'0)' .&' 
'-.,1(.'7 )/-. /2 /0' P3/.')./3 USV +0,. ,- =BCDDO USF#;C 
1,55,/0;   
 %&' '-.,1(.'7 )/-. /2 .&' PC- ,- 6(-'7 /0 .&' N-3('5, 
Z(M9R- USFHD 1,55,/0 43/:3(1 ./ ()*+,3' ',:&. 2(-. 4(.3/5 
)3(2.- I=PC-J ,0 CDDC; Y'0)' .&' '-.,1(.'7 ()*+,-,.,/0 )/-. 
2/3 /0' +0,. PC ,- USF$ 1,55,/0 I=BCDDCJ; 
%(65' "D 7,-45(9- .&' =BCDDE 0/31(5,['7 ()*+,-,.,/0 




T&'() "*+ T&'() ,- .(&/-,01 &234565/5,7 2,6/ 7,01&(58)9 /, 
F;<**=+ 
 "A$ "S$ P' 
>75/ &234565/5,7 2,6/ 







I7-(&/5,7 0&/) ?GB "+** "+*< "+"" 
>75/ &234565/5,7 2,6/ 
?>SA 15((5,7 F;<**=B  
C+D* #+<$ $+"" 
 
B. *+P*',*D LIF* SPAN 2F ,H* PLA,F2RMS 
I/ 56 &6641)9 /H) .(&/-,01 I5(( ') 9).(,J)9 -,0 & 
.)05,9 ,- /)7 J)&06+  
 
'. 2P*RA,I2N AND S"PP2R, (27S) '2S,  
K6 7, ,.)7L6,402)9 9&/& 56 &M&5(&'() ,7 /H) OOS ,- 
/H)6) .(&/-,016P /H)J &0) )6/51&/)9 &6 & .0,.,0/5,7 ,- 
/H)50 0)6.)2/5M) 475/ &234565/5,7 2,6/+ I/ 56 &6641)9 /H&/ 
/H) 475/ &774&( OOS 2,6/6 -,0 )&2H ,- /H) .(&/-,016 56 "*GP 
EG &79 EG -,0 >KQ6P >SQ6P &79 RC6 0)6.)2/5M)(J+  
 
D. *S,IMA,*D '2S, P*R "NI, P*R 9*AR 























T&IS )A+, INT,NTIONALL0 L,1T BLAN3 
 "#$
LIS$ &F R)F)R)N+)S 
%&'()&*+ ,- ./0012- 344(445*6 '7( 879(&' :; <&95'5)( 
8(99:954)= >44?(4 ;:9 '7( 345&@A&B5;5B C(65:*+ !"#$%&'()
*+,--"./"01)2#'%)34451)67-.)31)97.):1 DE@DF- 
 
G(;(*4( >*H?4'9I G&5JI .,(K "D+ /00L2- ;+")<&%")!#7$')6;=>6)




G(;(*4( >*H?4'9I G&5JI .RB' /#+ /0012-  =!) 9,H() !F".D0)




G(;(*4( SKH&'( .*-H-2- O0%,"-)9,H()>#P$&%")."Q)<,0')?,'%7-)




;"%@0) S7&.') ?$T-&#,'&7.) JU43- ./00"+ &)(*H(H /00L2 
C('95(M(H U:M $+ /00L+ ;9:) 
7''K=NNOOO-H'5B-)5JNH:B'95*(NV(JNH:HH5B'- 
 
W;(+ <?9&'+ X5J)&Y+ 3- W-+ Z G?9& G:*)(Y+ RYJ() ./00F2- 
G&'& ;?45:* ;:9 & 4?9M(5JJ&*B( 4I4'()= &HH9(445*6 4:)( 
K9&B'5B&J K9:PJ()4-  !(0'"@0) V./&.""%&./1) 344W.) O*!V./)
344W.)JX'+)O.'"%.,'&7.,-)*7.M"%".#")7. J5UJX)>$/- #E/@#EL- 
 
[&M(9+ G-A-+ \&B:P4+ A-3-+ ]7*6+ ^-]-+ Z 3JH(94:*+ G- 
./00L2- ,J5H(4 :* G:)&5* A9:'(B'5:* <('7:H:J:65(4 K9(4(*'(H 
&' '7( >UTRC<, 3**?&J <(('5*6 /00L- 
 
[&M(9+ G-A-+ \&B:P4+ A-3- ./00L2- >) B&%'+UR",'+) L7D"-) M7%)
M7%) '+") C,%/") !+&F) ?%7T-"@) &.) L,%&'&@") R7@,&.) ?%7'"#'&7.)
L"'+7D7-7/(. G9&;' K&K(9- RK(9&'5:*4 C(4(&9B7 G(K&9')(*'+ 
U&M&J A:4'69&H?&'( ,B7::J+ <:*'(9(I+ ]3- 
 
O.'"%.,'&7.,-) L,%&'&@") 2%/,.&Y,'&7.- 3>, '9&*4K:*H(94- 
C('95(M(H U:M $+ /00L+ ;9:) 7''K=NNOOO-5):-:96- 
 
C:44+ ,-<- ./00L2- O.'%7D$#'&7.)'7)F%7T,T&-&'()@7D"-0) .$'7 
(H-2- _:*H:*= 3B&H()5B A9(44- 
 
 "#0
Sanche+, S. .. /20012. S3readsheet for generating 
orthogonal and nearl=>orthogonal ?@ designs in natural 
levels.  Cetrieved on Dug ", 200E, from 
htt3GHHdiana.cs.n3s.nav=.milHSeed?aI. 
 
Sanche+, S. .. /20062. WorL smarter, not harderG guidelines 
for designing simulation eM3eriments. !"#$%%&'()* #, -.% 
/001 2'(-%" S'4567-'#( 8#(,%"%($%, eds. ?.N. Perrone, N.P. 
Wieland, P. ?iu, Q. G. ?aSson, T. .. Nicol, and C... 
NuVimoto, 12>1W. 
 
U:S: 8#7*- ;57"& N7=')7-'#( 8%(-%". Dutomatic XT S=stems. 
Cetrieved on Nov 1, 200E, from 
htt3GHHSSS.navcen.uscg.govHenavHais 
 "#"
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
"$ %&'&()& *&+,(-+./ 0('123.4-1( 5&(4&2 
64$ 7&/81-29 :-2;-(-.  
 
<$ %=>/&? @(1A B-C2.2? 
D.8./ E1)4;2.>=.4& F+,11/ 
G1(4&2&?9 5./-'12(-.  
 
H$ E21'&))12 E.42-+-. I$ J.+1C) 
%&K.243&(4 1' LK&2.4-1() M&)&.2+, 
D.8./ E1)4;2.>=.4& F+,11/ 
G1(4&2&?9 5./-'12(-. 
 
#$ %-)4-(;=-),&> E21'&))12 %1(./> E$ N.8&2 
%&K.243&(4 1' LK&2.4-1() M&)&.2+, 
D.8./ E1)4;2.>=.4& F+,11/ 
G1(4&2&?9 5./-'12(-. 
 
O$ 5IE* PFD QM&4R S.?(& E$ T=;,&)9 J2$ 
F&(-12 B&+4=2&2 
%&K.243&(4 1' LK&2.4-1() M&)&.2+, 
D.8./ E1)4;2.>=.4& F+,11/ 
G1(4&2&?9 5./-'12(-. 
 
U$ 5IE* PFD QM&4R J&''2&? V$ @/-(& 
F&(-12 B&+4=2&2 
%&K.243&(4 1' LK&2.4-1() M&)&.2+, 
D.8./ E1)4;2.>=.4& F+,11/ 
G1(4&2&?9 5./-'12(-. 
 
W$ I))-)4.(4 E21'&))12 %.8-> I/>&2)1( 
%&K.243&(4 1' LK&2.4-1() M&)&.2+, 
D.8./ E1)4;2.>=.4& F+,11/ 
G1(4&2&?9 5./-'12(-. 
 
X$ B*5 G./+1/3 F,&& 
T&.> LK&2.4-1() M&)&.2+, 72.(+, QD.8?R  
FI6 LK&2.4-1() M&)&.2+, L''-+&  
J1-(4 E/.() .(> *2.()'123.4-1( %&K.243&(4  
G-(-)42? 1' %&'&(+&9 F-(;.K12&  
F-(;.K12&  
 
 
